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ABSTRACT
Permits allowing qualified citizens to legally carry
a concealed weapon ("CCWs") in public have become
increasingly popular.

Nevada adopted more lenient CCW

standards in October of 1995, and an unprecedented number
of legally armed citizens in the public has resulted.
Supporters of CCWs claim the right to self-defense with
less crime resulting.

Critics claim more armed citizens

will only produce more violence and crime.
To answer this debate, the following was conducted;
(1) a literature review of private firearm ownership,
including CCWs, and crime,

(2) an analysis based

on Las Vegas' Uniform Crime Reports rates before and after
adopting these more lenient CCW standards, and (3) a survey
of recent Las Vegas CCW applicants.
This study failed to conclusively show that more CCWs
increase or decrease crime.

The CCW survey, however,

suggested that most CCW applicants believe obtaining a
CCW is an effective deterrent to crime.

Ill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Permits allowing qualified citizens to carry a
concealed weapon or firearm (here-after referred to as
a "CCW") in public have become increasingly popular.
Led by special interest groups like the National Rifle
Association, the number of states adopting more lenient
uniform CCW provisions for its residents to more readily
obtain these CCW permits has grown from nine in 1986,
to 31 in 1996 (Knox 1996).

Nevada adopted these more

lenient uniform CCW standards in October of 1995, and
a unprecedented number of armed citizens in the public
has resulted (Vogel 1995).
Supporters of more armed CCW citizens claim the need
and right of self-defense, and point to incidents such
as that reported in the March 5, 1996 edition of the
(Staunton, Virginia) Daily News Leader, where an armed
CCW pedestrian was physically attacked by one of three
convicted felons. "Suffering several blows, the man, a
carry permit holder, drew his .45 and loosed [sic] eight
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shots at his assailant, wounding him, stopping the attack
and chasing off the other miscreants.

The district

attorney refused to press charges, saying,
he acted in total self defense.

'We believe

The concealed weapon kept

this victim from being further injured.'"
Critics of the CCW concept claim more armed citizens
on the streets will only result in more violence either
by perpetrators now being forced to "shoot first" in
committing their crimes, or from an armed CCW citizen
over-reacting with lethal force in what starts out as
little more than a minor altercation with another citizen.
The February 23, 1996 issue of USA Today describes such
an incident where a traffic accident in Dallas, Texas
escalated into a verbal argument in which subsequently,
one driver began repeatedly punching the other, an armed
CCW holder.

The CCW driver responded by pulling out his

.40 caliber handgun, and killing his antagonist.

While

the courts later exonerated the CCW owner on the basis
of justifiable self-defense, Texas State Representative
Harold Dutton is quoted, "If not for the (new Texas CCW)
law, these families probably wouldn't be suffering today."
While the outcomes of these two examples are extreme,
dramatic, and debatable, they are both founded in the basic
hypothesis of more lenient CCW laws that this thesis will
address, that being; "How does more lenient state CCW
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laws and its resulting increase in armed citizens in the
public, affect crime rates in Las Vegas?"
More armed citizens in the public could directly reduce
crime through acts of self-defense, where an armed CCW
owner foils an attempt by an assailant during the
commission of a crime, or indirectly through deterrence,
by increasing the level of real or perceived risk for the
criminal to attempt a crime, as the CCW victim may be
armed, and the non-CCW victim cannot be readily
distinguished as such.
A reduction in crime attributable to more armed citizens
in the public may result in displacement, where a
corresponding increase in crime occurs in a neighboring
community where there are less armed citizens in the
public.

Additionally, crimes possibly reduced by these

new more lenient CCW laws (i.e. violent crimes) may be
displaced by an increase in other types of crimes not
involving direct victim contact (i.e. property crimes).
More armed citizens in the public could directly
increase crime as these armed CCW citizens could decide
to commit crimes themselves, as opportunities to use armed
force present themselves.

More armed citizens in the

public could indirectly increase crime by increasing the
level of real or perceived risk for a criminal to attempt
a crime, as the CCW citizen may be armed, and the unarmed
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non-CCW citizen cannot be readily distinguished as such.
Hence, the crimininal may now arm him/herself for
protection to commit a crime, and may even adopt a "shoot
the victim first" attitude.

Finally, more armed citizens

in the public may have no measurable positive or negative
effect on crime in a given community.
In examining these possible effects of CCWs in Las
Vegas, the following areas will be covered in this thesis;
(1) a detailed overview of CCWs in general,

(2) a review

of key studies regarding firearms and crime in general,
both from a theoretical basis and the current literature,
including a review of published studies pertaining
specifically to CCWs and crime,

(3) an analysis of Las

Vegas and other selected metropolitan cities regarding
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports
(U.C.R.s) for crime rates before and after state CCW
programs were initiated, (4) an analysis of new data from
a survey of Nevada CCW applicants, and finally,

(5)

conclusions in attempting to integrate all of this
information together.
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CHAPTER 2
A GENERAL CCW OVERVIEW

A CCW may best be viewed as an extension of individual
firearm ownership.

While private firearm ownership is

regulated by both federal and state/local law, it is not
a prerequisite to have a CCW to own a handgun.

A CCW is

simply a permit issued under state law which allows a
qualified firearm owner/resident to travel legally armed
(weapon concealed on his/her person) in most public places
within that particular state.

Without a CCW, a citizen

may be similarly armed only within the boundaries of
his/her own premises or property.

The lone exception to

this is Vermont, which does not require its residents to
have a CCW to carry a handgun concealed in most public
settings throughout the state (Cramer and Kopel 1994).
On October 1, 1995, Nevada became the 27th state in
adopting more uniform standards in issuing, or more
specifically, in denying CCWs (Vogel 1995).

These

liberalized uniform standards changed the language of
issuing CCWs from a "may issue" to a "shall issue" basis
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and made it more difficult for the CCW issuing authorities
to deny a requesting citizen a permit (Kime 1995).
Under the old "may issue" basis, most states allowing
CCWs usually gave a local police chief, sheriff, or judge
much discretionary power in issuing them, and they in turn
typically granted them only on a "compelling need basis"
such as a dangerous job or a threatened individual
situation (Witkin 1994).

Pro-gun advocates, however,

claimed this system was abused, with only celebrities,
politicians, and friends of the authorities arbitrarily
receiving CCWs (Gottleib and Tartaro 1995).

"From 1972

to 1992, for instance, the Los Angeles police department
awarded one civilian permit; to incoming police
commissioner Willie Williams, before he was sworn in as
an officer (Van Biema 1995:28)".
The city of Los Angeles was subsequently sued in the
fall of 1992 for its discriminatory handling of the
permits.

Settled out of court before the trial, the city

agreed to issue CCWs on a basis of need.

In the nine

months following the settlement, however, only five permits
had been issued; three to government employees, and two
to private attorneys (Cramer and Kopel 1994).
In Las Vegas, CCWs were tightly regulated by the county
sheriff.

With the election of current Clark County Sheriff

Jerry Keller, the criteria for CCWs began to loosen in
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early 1995 with about 3,800 being issued under the old
discretionary "may issue" criteria prior to the October
1 "shall issue" statewide reforms (Vogel 1995).

From

January 1995 to July 1996, almost 10,000 CCWs had been
issued in Nevada, with over 8,000 of these being in Clark
County (Puit 1996).
As it now stands, for an administrative fee totaling
$99.00, a requesting Nevada resident 21 years or older
"shall be" issued a CCW valid for five years, within 120
days from the Sheriff's department, providing a routine
background check shows no outstanding warrants, conviction
of a crime involving the use or threatened use of force
or violence, conviction of any felony, domestic violence,
stalking, restraining order, history of alcohol or
substance abuse, or mental health problems.

Additionally,

the applicant must successfully complete an approved CCW
instructional course, covering basic firearms use, safety,
and proficiency, and legal/lethal force implications,
prior to the permit being issued.

These CCW courses are

available from various sources throughout the state and
range in cost from approximately $125 to 150

(LVMPD

Concealed Firearms Q/A 1995).
These basic requirements are more or less similar in
other "shall issue" states.

Interestingly, Texas also

requires as part of its CCW course, sessions in
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non-violent conflict resolution training; i.e. "I'm OK
Your OK", "Getting in Touch with One's Inner Child", and
the "LEAPS" method- Learning, Empathizing, Asking,
Paraphrasing and Summarizing (Caroline 1996).
Thus, in a "shall issue" state like Nevada, specific
guidelines are used in obtaining and issuing a CCW, and
these guidelines are statewide in scope and uniformity.
Because of this, the "pro" or "anti" discretionary power
and attitude of the county sheriff or local administrator
is bypassed in denying a permit to an individual by state
law.

The end result is generally more CCW applicants being

approved in a "shall issue" state than a "may issue state".
While states issuing CCWs on a "shall issue" basis can
be classified as more lenient in their criteria with any
qualified resident desiring a permit being issued one,
care should be taken not to automatically classify all
"may issue" states as restrictive in issuing CCWs.
Depending on a "may issue" state's individual CCW
authorities, permits could (but not likely) be issued as
freely as in a "shall issue" state, or may be very
restrictive, depending on the particular political climate.
Likewise, a given "may issue" state may have one city or
county with very restrictive CCW criteria, and a
neighboring municipality with easier standards, all
depending on the whims of the particular county sheriff
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or local administrator.

Colorado, for example, is a "may

issue" state, and CCW has been used as a political
football.
A group of Colorado women, organized as "SWARM" (Safety
for Women and Responsible Motherhood, Inc.) have as their
sole purpose, lobbying for reformed concealed carry
provisions in that state (Tartaro 1995).

El Paso County

Sheriff John Anderson made good on a November campaign
promise, and adopted the most lenient CCW standards in
the state, and ran out of the 1,000 application forms he
had available within the first 48 hours (Van Biema 1995).
For comparison, in neighboring Denver, a total of only
45 permits had been granted by Police Chief Ari Zavaras
as of 1988 (Cramer and Kopel 1994).
Finally, a "may issue" state's criteria for issuing
permits can change either direction with time.

An example

of this is the changes in Clark County previously
mentioned.
Statistically, in "shall issue" states, approximately
1 to 4% of the total population chooses to obtain a CCW
permit (McNichol 1995, Cramer and Kopel 1994).

A survey

of CCW applicants in Texas found that 60% of applicants
were crime victims, with 87% saying they were getting the
permits to protect their families.

A total of 97% owned

a handgun prior to applying for their CCW.

Additionally,
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85% owned a rifle and 83% a shotgun (American Rifleman
1996).

In Oklahoma, females accounted for 17% of all CCW

applicants, and the major reason cited for wanting a CCW
is personal safety (Ingraham 1996).

Women constituted

18.6% and 22.9% of CCWs in Washington and Oregon
respectively (Lott and Mustard 1996).
Like them or not, more lenient CCWs have increased in
popularity with "shall issue" states now numbering 31.
A list of all 31 "shall issue" CCW states is contained
in the "Appendixes".
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW

While being issued a CCW is not a prerequisite to owning
a firearm, a review beginning with the possible positive
or negative effects on crime by private firearm ownership,
and eventually leading to CCWs is appropriate, as this
lays down a foundation from which we can focus from the
general to the specific.
Numerous studies exist regarding the effectiveness of
firearm use, in deterring crime, and specifically in
self-defense.

Other studies have addressed the related

benefits and risks associated with firearm ownership.
Only four studies have been published examining CCWs and
crime rates.
Unfortunately, the conclusions and findings of these
studies are often in conflict with each other.

For each

study reporting a positive effect, another concludes with
a negative finding, and vice versa.

This should not be

surprising given the controversial, emotional, and often
political nature of private firearm ownership in our
society today.

11
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MOTIVES FOR GÜN OWNERSHIP

Firearm ownership has been studied in part from several
different perspectives, including religious affiliation
(Little and Vogel 1992, Young 1989), culture (Kopel 1992,
Bruce-Briggs 1976), regional "southern" subcultures
(Ellison 1991, Dixon and Lizotte 1987), gender (Sheley,
Brody, Wright, et al 1994), and personality attributes
including sexual inadequacies (Diener and Kerber 1979).
A number of studies, have also addressed firearm ownership
as a response to perceived crime.
Lizotte and Bordua (1980) for example, propose that
not all legal firearm owners have the same motives for
ownership.

Those who hunt and target shoot often have

as motives family tradition and socialization, while those
who own primarily for protection do so as a reaction to
perceived local violent crime.

They also found violent

attitudes and behavior not to be predictors of protective
firearm ownership.
Smith and Uchida (1988) conclude that firearm ownership
is a form of "self-help" that varies by owner depending
on perceived vulnerability to crime.

Accordingly, less

perceived effectiveness of formal social control (i.e.
the police), and less perceived informal social control
of youth, results in increased private firearm ownership.
Young, McDowall and Loftin (1987) found protective

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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firearm ownership inversely related to confidence in the
criminal justice system (the police and the courts), and
this relationship is independent of demographic and
socioeconomic variables and fear of crime.
Regardless of the exact motives for these households
being armed, about 25-30% of all firearm owners do so
primarily for self-defense or protection against crime
(Wright 1984, Wright 1995, Kleck 1991, McDowall 1995),
with women representing half of this number (Stange 1995).
Additionally, 71% own firearms at least in part for
protection (Kleck 1991).

Finally, between 40 and 67% of

handgun owners list protection as their main reason for
ownership (Wright 1995, Kleck 1991).
Studies of why citizens decide to be armed in public
places is limited.

Bankston and Thompson (1989) however,

found that the most direct influences for citizens carrying
a gun for protection were: age, gender, and most important,
the belief that the presence of a gun is an effective
deterrent to crime.
Ironically, the principle reason criminals acquire and
carry firearms (58%) is also for "self-protection"
and Rossi 1986).

(Wright

The motive of "to use in my crimes" was

mentioned only 28% of the time (Wright and Rossi 1986).
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1 4

THEORIES ON GDN OWNERSHIP
AND DETERRENCE

Private firearm ownership can conceivably deter crime
and victimization not only through acts of self-defense,
but by also discouraging perpetrators from attempting
crimes.

Such a deterrent effect is supported by the

classical school of criminology.
In the classical theory, victim selection is based on
"the ease with which they can be victimized", and contends
that "targets that pose...little resistance will be chosen
over those with greater risks (Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990:13) ."
In 1764, Cesare Beccaria, a founder of the classical
school, wrote in. On Crimes and Punishment, that "Laws
forbidding people to bear arms...only disarm those who
are neither inclined nor determined to commit crimes... Such
laws place the assaulted at a disadvantage and the
assailant at an advantage, and they multiply rather than
decrease the number of murders, since an unarmed person
may be attacked with greater confidence than someone who
is armed (1986:73)."
Thus, from this classical perspective, the criminal
is more likely to victimize the unarmed as opposed to the
armed, as criminal behavior is based on "a process of
rationally calculated choice to achieve maximimum pleasure
at the cost of minimimum pain (Pfohl 1985:63)."

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Furthermore, the classical school proposes that deviance
can be deterred through the use of calculated punishment,
providing that this punishment meets the criteria of
certainty, swiftness, and appropriate severity.

This

deterrence is both specific and general in nature,
affecting both those criminals actually punished, and those
who fear the possible punishment (Pfohl 1985).

An armed

potential victim, willing and capable of using lethal force
in self-defense, can be viewed as possessing these
necessary levels of certain, swift, and severe risk
(possible punishment) to deter victimization by the
rationally calculating assailant.
More modern victimization theories contain in part,
this classical relationship of "increasing the risks to
the criminals to reduce the criminal acts".

The "routine

activity" theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), for example,
focuses on three key elements in the commission of a crime:
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence
of capable guardians against a violation.

These later

two elements could be influenced by firearm ownership,
and the lack of any of these elements should diminish
victimization.
The "structural-choice" theory of victimization in part
proposes that "the subjective value of a person or object
and its level of guardianship determines the choice of
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the particular crime target (Meier and Miethe 1993:475)".
"Guardianship" in this theory is divided into both "social
and physical" subgroups, with physical guardianship
including the ownership of firearms.

"Regardless of its

particular form, the availability of capable guardianship
is deemed important because it indicates increased 'costs'
to would-be offenders...and thus should decrease
opportunity for victimization (Meier and Miethe 1993:483)".
Some theories, however, propose that firearm ownership
may serve as a stimulus to aggression, and elicit violent
and sometimes assaultive behavior by firearm owners or
any who may come in contact with the owners of the firearm
itself.
Berkowitz (1968), for example, conducted a series of
controlled experiments to measure a "weapons effect", where
the mere presence of a firearm may result in more
aggressive behavior from otherwise benevolent people, that
would not have ordinarily occurred.

Typically, children

given toy guns to play with were later observed displaying
more antisocial behavior than children with non-gun toys
(Berkowitz 1968), drivers were noted to honk their horns
more often (i.e. more aggression) at a stalled pickup truck
with a rifle racked visibly in its cab's rear window, than
in a "unarmed" truck (Berkowitz 1981).

In effect, more

firearms results in more aggression from all involved.
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armed or not.
While some other experimental studies (Frodi 1973,
Leyens and Parke 1975, Page and O'Neal 1977), support this
"weapons effect" theory, other experimental studies do
not.

Turner, Layton and Simons (1975) and Fraczek and

Macaulay (1971) found the presence of a firearm to have
an inhibiting effect on aggressive behavior from their
experimental studies, as the potentially assaultive people
feared the possiblity of being shot if they exhibited
aggression to their armed victims.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON GUN OWNERSHIP
AND DETERRENCE

Analysis of existing crime rate data has been used to
propose a deterrent effect of firearm ownership on
different types of crimes.

Kleck (1991) found that

countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, which
have significantly lower private firearm ownership than
the United States, have a significantly higher rate of
burglaries of occupied residences.

Witkin (1994) cites

an analysis from the 1979-87 National Crime Survey which
found only a 14% successful burglary rate against occupied
armed homes verses a 33% rate for occupied homes as a
whole.
Other studies have found that firearm ownership can
often inhibit or deter violent crime.

Kleck and McElrath
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(1991:669) analyzed data on violent incidents among
strangers, taken from the 1979-85 National Crime Surveys
and the 1982 Supplementary Homicide Reports, and found
that "firearms, appear to inhibit attack".
Robin (1991), analyzed data from the Orlando, Florida
rape study and found that firearm ownership provides a
general deterrent effect.

After the city's rape rate

tripled from 1965 to 1966, the Orlando Police Department
offered a highly media publicized handgun self-defense
program that was completed by 6,00 0 women from October
1966 to April 1967.

Based on U.C.R. data analysis for

the following year, Orlando's rape rate dropped almost
9 0%, despite actual handgun ownership not increasing, nor
any data documenting a firearm actually being used in
self-defense against an attempted rape.
Other studies, however, have found firearm ownership
to be no real deterrent to victimization, or to increase
the chance of death to the owner.

Green (1987) for

example, in examining the previously mentioned Orlando
rape study's U.C.R. data (expanded to 1964-69 in this
study's analysis), found an effect of displacement, not
deterrence.

Specifically, rape decreased 60.7% in

Orlando, but increased 60.5% in surrounding non-Orlando
areas.
Other studies have found firearm ownership not to deter
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crime, but to instead, be associated with higher rates
of suicide and homicide.

Kellermann, Rivera, Rushforth,

et al (1993) for example, studied homicides in the home
in Memphis, Cleveland, and Seattle over a five year
period.

Compared to a control group of nonhomicide homes,

those with guns are three times more likely to be the
scene of a homicide than comparable homes without guns.
Loftin, McDowall, and Wiersema (1991) examined the
impact of restricting handgun ownership in Washington
D.C..

Their findings were that restrictive handgun

legislation resulted in an immediate, abrupt decline in
gun suicides and homicides, without an increase in non-gun
suicides and homicides.
Studies supporting and not supporting firearm ownership
and deterrence have their limitations.

Those suggesting

a deterrent effect often cannot clearly attribute
decreases in crime rates specifically and solely to
firearms ownership (i.e. is private firearm ownership
the sole deterrent to a buglary, or are homeowners who
own firearms for protection also more likely to have home
security alarm systems, better quality door and window
locks, and to have taken other precautions to "harden"
their homes from victimization as opposed to non-gun
homeowners?).

On the other hand, studies suggesting that

private firearm ownership results in increased rates of
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homicides and suicides seem at odds with other studies
contending that the same behavior would still occur, at
the same high rates, but only by other means and methods
(Wright and Rossi 1986, Kopel 1993, and Leenaars and
Lester 1994).
Another way of examining for a possible deterrent
effect of firearm ownership would be from the criminal's
perspective, through the use of surveys, for if a true
deterrent effect of firearms ownership does exist, it
would be the criminal perpetrator who would experience
it.

Surveys of convicted felons suggest a deterrence

effect from armed citizens.

For example, Erickson and

Stenseth (1996:61) polled 310 armed store robbers
incarcerated in twenty state prisons, and found that among
a list of effective deterrents, "three of the top six had
to do with armed opposition".
Wright and Rossi (1986), conducted a national survey
of over 1,600 incarcerated felons regarding victim
selection.

"Generally speaking, felons from states with

more gun owners worried proportionally more about 'armed
victim' encounters than did felons in other states
(1986:154)" and that while it may be difficult for the
criminal to assess whether a potential victim is armed
or not, "criminals are no more anxious to encounter armed
victims than victims are to encounter armed criminals
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(1986:144)".

Additional findings from this comprehensive

study (1986:146) were;
1) 81% felt the "smart criminal" should try to find
out if a potential victim is armed.
2) 74% who committed burglaries avoided occupied
buildings for among other reasons, fear of being
shot.
3) 40% did not commit a specific crime for fear that
the victim was armed.
4) 34% said they had been scared off, wounded, or
captured at least once by an armed citizen.
5) 57% felt the typical criminal had a greater fear
of the armed citizen, than running into the police.
Kleck (1988) may offer an explanation for this last
survey attitude by estimating that over three times more
felons are killed annually in "excusable self-defense"
or "justifiable" shootings by civilians, as opposed to
the police.

Specifically, "about 1500-2800 felons were

killed by gun-wielding civilians in self-defense or some
other legally justified cause in 1980 (Kleck 1991:113)"
and "between 8700 and 16,600 nonfatal, legally permissible
woundings of criminals by gun-armed civilians in 1980
(Kleck 1991:116)".

Additionally, Snyder (1993) cites only

2% of civilian shootings involving an innocent person
mistakenly identified as a criminal, while the error rate
for the police is 11%.
Conversely, Wright and Rossi (1986) also found that
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among these incarcerated felons surveyed, concern of
confronting an armed citizen was a primary reason for
deciding to carry a weapon themselves.
There are, however, limitations of these criminal
surveys in determining the deterrent effect of armed
citizens.

First, incarcerated criminal surveys may

reflect attitudes that may differ from those of criminals
who have successfully avoided apprehension.

Secondly,

some have cautioned against interpreting these surveys
as meaning that armed citizens will truly deter criminals
from committing crimes altogether.

Green (1987:71) has

stated that "the only inference one can take from these
results, it seems, is that potential criminals avoid
crimes against victims perceived to be armed and attack
those perceived as unarmed, which would indicate crime
displacement rather than crime deterrence".
Green (1987) acknowledges that an armed victim may
indeed successfully foil a criminal attempt (an act of
self-defense), but questions whether the very thought of
an armed society as a whole has any true effect on
inhibiting a criminal from committing a crime for fear
of being shot by any random potential victim (general
deterrence).
In conclusion, some studies have supported the theory
of private firearm ownership deterring crime, while others
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have not supported it, by showing evidence of either
displacement, or increases in crime rates.
DEFENSIVE OSES OF FIREARMS

How often firearms are used in acts of self-defense,
and how effective they are has been analyzed in a number
of studies.

Consensus, however, cannot be reached.

Self-defensive acts involving firearms in the United
States range from annual estimates of 64,615 (McDowall
and Wiersema 1994) to 2.2-2.5 million (Kleck and Gertz
1995), with over 400,000 of this later estimate being
life saving in nature.

Numerous other studies and surveys

estimate annual defensive gun use rates in the United
States somewhere between these two figures; 764,036
(Tarrance 1994), 1,098.409 (DMI, 1978), and 1,487,342
(Mauser 1990).

Hart (1981) estimates 1,797,461 annual

defensive uses involving only handguns.
Approximately 3% of the United States population is
a victim of a violent crime annually (Kleck 1991).

The

incidence of defensive firearm use range from .09%
annually per U.S. household according to the 1992 National
Crime Victimization Survey, to 1.3% annually and 3.3% over
a 5 year recall period per surveyed adults (Kleck and
Gertz 1995). Estimates from other studies include; .18
annually per total crime victims, and .83% per violent
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crime victims (McDowall and Wiersema 1994), 1-2% over a
5 year recall period per surveyed adults (Tarrance 1994),
3.6% over a lifetime recall period per surveyed adults
(Gallop 1993), 3.8% over a 5 year recall period per
surveyed adults (Mauser 1990), 3% for handguns in defense
of burglaries only by adults (Trisch 1993), 4% involving
handguns only over a 5 year recall period per surveyed
adults (Hart 1981), and 7% during a lifetime recall period
per surveyed adults (DMI 1978).
Studies designed to measure defensive firearm use
among firearm owners surveyed cite incident rates of 11.8%
at least once in their lives (Gallop 1995) and 9-16% for
a lifetime recall period (Time/CNN 1989).

Additionally,

the Nevada Policy Research Institute cites a Psychology
Today study which reported that 81% of good Samaritans
who came to the aid of violent crime victims, were gun
owners who carried their guns in their cars or on their
persons (NPRI 1996).
Kleck and Gertz (1995) have noted a number of
limitations which could result in some
underestimating defensive gun use.

surveys

For example, the 1992

NCVS (on which the 1994 McDowall study

is based)was not

designed to measure rates of defensive

firearm use, but

to measure victimization.

It did not contain a direct

question on self-defense with a firearm, but only general
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questions on whether anything was done for protection.
Thus, those surveyed had to volunteer any information
regarding defensive firearm use.

As these questions were

administered by representatives of the federal government
without anonymity for those surveyed, candid reponses may
have been inhibited given the subject matter of a
defensive shooting.

Additionally, other surveys may not

allow for measurement of more than one defensive gun use
per individual or household surveyed, or may use long
recall periods which could contribute to memory loss.
Another limitation which could result in an
undercounting of defensive gun use is assuming that all
gun owners own guns for the same purpose.

As opposed to

hunters, target shooters, collectors, and others like
them, only 10% of all adults and 30% of gun owners list
self-defense as their major reason for owning a gun
(McDowall 1995), and only 10% of gun owners store their
guns loaded and accessible some or all of the time
(Nelson, Grant, Powell 1996).
Others, however, question the accuracy of the higher
defensive gun use estimates, due to these surveys'
definitions, or lack of definitions of "self-defense".
"An awful lot of what some people would call self-defense
is, like, somebody asks you for a quarter and you tell
them to get lost, but as you walk away you keep your hand
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on your gun" says Philip Cook, a Duke University economist
(Guter 1996:89).

In addition, many incidents that people

report as self-defense may in fact be assaults, in which
the respondent takes a more active role than he admits.
"In many instances, we may only be talking to one side
of an argument,' says Zimring (Guter 1996:89)."
Some studies have examined firearms being used for
self-defense on the basis of "risk-benefit" ratios.
Kellermann, Rivera and Rushforth (1993:1084) found that
homes with guns are three times more likely to be the
scene of a homicide than comparable homes without guns,
and conclude that "the risks of having a gun in the home
substantially outweigh the benefits...people should be
strongly discouraged from keeping guns in their homes".
Kellermann and Reay (1986) found that a gun kept in the
house is approximately 4 3 times more likely to kill a
family member or friend than an intruder.

Other studies,

however, have found that the vast majority of defensive
firearm uses are not lethal in outcome, and predominately
involves not firing and scaring the criminal off, holding
him/her at bay until arrival of the police, firing and
missing the assailant, or nonfatally wounding him/her.
"Well under 1% of defensive gun uses involve a criminal
being killed (Kleck 1991:129)".

Estimates of victims even

firing their weapons, range from 24 to 28% (Kleck and

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

Gertz 1995, McDowall and Wiersema 1994).

Snyder (1993)

found citizens merely brandishing their weapons or firing
a warning shot 98% of the time.
Finally, some studies have found that for some crimes,
any type of resistance is ill advised.

Wright, Rossi and

Daly (1983:141) state that "for the types of crimes in
question (mainly, home burglary, against occupied
residences, home robberies, and aggravated assaults), the
evidence also suggests that one is more likely to be
injured or killed if one resists the offender in any way
(whether with a weapon or with some other protective
action) than if one merely capitulates".
Other studies find resistance with firearms to result
in less injury for the victim than capitulation or
resistance with other methods.

Kleck and McElrath

(1991:669) for example, found that "deadly weapons,
including firearms appear to inhibit attack, and in the
case of attack, to reduce the probability of injury...the
overall net effect of the availability of guns on the
probability of the victim's death is very close to zero".
McDowall (1995) found that although firearm defense is
rare, it is often successful when it does occur, and
firearm owners who employ their use were less likely to
suffer serious injury, and more likely to report that the
offender had failed to complete the crime.
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In summary, there is no consensus regarding the
effectiveness of firearms for self-defense.

Studies have

found firearms for self-defense to be used with various
degrees of frequency and effectiveness, and with various
degrees of risks and benefits.
GUN AVAILABILITY, DENSITY AND CRIME

The United States is the most heavily armed industrial
nation in the world with recent estimates of privately
owned firearms ranging from 150 million (Robin 1991:) to
approximately 200 million (Wright 1995, Kleck 1991) to
over 231 million (Kates et al 1995).

Handguns account

for between 50-65 million (Robin 1991) to over 82 million
of these totals (Kates et al 1995).
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Newton and Zimring (1970) and Zimring (1991) conclude
that more firearms in circulation ("gun density") correlates
with more gun-related crimes and deaths.

For example,

in examining death rates during robberies in Detroit,
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Zimring (1977:317) stated, "any countermeasure that
succeeded in reducing gun availability in robbery appears
to likely to reduce both the number of robberies and the
death rate per thousand robberies".
Zimring is quoted, "Guns escalate conflict into, lethal
violence.

If everyone were armed...an attacker would have

to assume that the victim is armed, so he'd carry more
lethal weapons and use them earlier...If there's a subway
full of .38s, what happens when someone's ghetto blaster
is too loud? (Adler 1990:82)".
Other studies support the gun density relationship to
increased levels of homicides and suicides, homicides,
and fatal firearm accidents

(Loftin et al 1991, McDowall

1991, and McDowall and Loftin 1985).
The Loftin et al (1991) study additionally supported
the Zimring-Cook "weapon-choice" theory that proposes that
violent acts differ and vary with respect to intent to
kill.

Specifically, while some violent acts are highly

motivated and focused in violent determination, others
are relatively weak in resolve and short lived.

In these

later cases, the frequency in which a particular type of
weapon will be used is influenced by its availability.
Hence, while some people will select guns because they
are determined to kill, and firearms are more lethal than
other weapons that may be substituted for them, other
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people will select firearms only because they are readily
available.
Others, however, propose that gun density is due to
"reverse causation", that is, where people feel most
vulnerable to crime is where firearm ownership may most
dense, and that firearm ownership is simply a rational
response to the threat of crime (Kleck 1991, Polsby 1994),
or conclude that homicide and suicide rates will remain
the same, despite firearm restrictions due to
substitution of other weapons and methods (Wright and
Rossi 1986, Kopel 1992, Kopel 1993, Leenaars and Lester
1994).
Kates, Schaffer, and Lattimer (1995) found gun density
to have no effect on homicide rates.

Analyzing data over

a twenty year period from 1973 to 1992, they found: the
number of firearms in the U.S. had increased from
122,304,980 to 221,851,212, the homicide rate remained
about the same, 9.4 and 9.3 per 100,000 population, and
the percentage of homicides committed by guns remained
about the same, 68.5% and 68.2% respectively.

Moderate

fluctuations in homicide rates and gun homicide rates were
noted over the years studied, but nothing that could be
correlated to the strong progressive increase in the number
of guns itself.
Some studies have found higher gun density to reduce
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crime.

Toch and Lizotte (1992:234) state that "national

patterns show little violent crime where guns are most
dense implies that guns do not elicit aggression in any
meaningful way.

Quite to the contrary, these findings

suggest that high saturations of guns in places, or
something correlated with that condition, inhibit illegal
aggression".

Thornberry (1995:18) correlates legal

firearm ownership with less juvenile crime due to the
recreational use (socialization via hunting or target
shooting) of firearms by the juvenile's family as a whole.
Specifically, as opposed to boys who illegally own
firearms, "boys who own legal firearms, however, have much
lower rates of delinquency and drug use and are even
slightly less delinquent than nonowners of guns".
History may offer a mixed, ironic twist to the gun
density concept.

Cramer and Kopel (1994) cite old west

historian Roger McGrath's detailed study of the nineteenth
century mining towns of Aurora and Bodie in the Sierra
Nevadas.

The population was heavily influenced by young

transients who worked in the mines.

Saloons, brothels

and gambling halls were common, popular hang-outs for
many of these young miners, who often got into drunken
brawls at them.

Local law enforcement was ineffective

and often corrupt, and as such, almost everyone carried
a gun for protection.

The homicide rates in these two
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towns were high, in some cases exceeding that of modern
Washington D.C..

However, almost all of these shootings

and killings were limited to saloon shootings between the
young drunken miners when one of their arguments had
escalated out of control.

The more "respectable" part

of Aurora and Bodie's population, who spent little of their
time "drinking and fighting with each other", were subject
to almost no crime or victimizations.

Robbery, burglary

(7% and 1% the rate of modern New York respectively), and
rape were rare events.

"Respectable" women and girls were

almost never accosted or insulted in any manner.

This

in part was due to a nineteenth century respect depravity
paid decency, but also in part to the knowledge that sudden
death would follow any other course.
In summary, some studies support the relationship of
gun density and increased crime rates, while other studies
do not support it, or find a beneficial decrease in crime
rates due to increased gun density.
STUDIES ON CCWs A ND CRIME

Unlike the numerous studies on firearm ownership in
general and its possible positive or negative effects on
crime, studies specifically dealing with CCWs and crime
are relatively limited.

Only four studies have been

published, all recently, regarding the effects of easing
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Cramer and Kopel (1994:8-40) analyzed homicide rates
for ten CCW states versus the nation for each year from
1959 to 1992.

The ten states and the year of their

adopting "shall issue" or more lenient CCW criteria were;
Washington (1961), Florida (1987), Virginia (1988), Georgia
(1989), Pennsylvania (1989), Oregon (1989), West Virginia
(1989), Idaho (1990), Montana (1991), and Mississippi
(1991 ) .
Cramer and Kopel's findings (1994) were inconclusive
for Washington, West Virginia, Oregon, Idaho, Montana,
and Mississippi.

Carry reform appears to have reduced

homicide rates in Florida and Georgia, but to have not
been effective in Virginia.

In Pennsylvania, CCW reform

may have been beneficial in Philadelphia, and apparently
has resulted in no harm outside of Philadelphia.

"In

neither large or small states do we see evidence of obvious
long-term increases in murder rates after passage of the
laws..homicide rates will not increase as a result of
crimes committed by persons with carry permits.

Carry

reform legislation may or may not reduce the homicide rate,
but reform legislation clearly does not raise the homicide
rate (1 994 :39-40)."
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Cramer and Kopel (1994) also compared the number of
CCWs issued and crime rates for different counties in
California, a "may issue" state where CCW issuing criteria
varies widely.

Using 1989 data, California's 58 counties

were divided into three groups depending on the prevalence
of CCW ownership; 19 counties with less than .1% of its
total population having CCWs, 22 counties having between
.1% and 1% CCW ownership, and 17 counties with more than
1% of its population owning a CCW.
Comparing the crime rates for "highly restrictive CCW
counties" to "moderately restrictive CCW counties" to
"non-restrictive CCW counties", Cramer and Kopel (1994)
found generally less aggravated assault, homicide, rape,
and robbery to occur as the level of CCWs in the counties
increased.
Limitations to Cramer and Kopel's 1994 California
analysis include the fact that the 19 "highly restrictive
CCW/higher crime rate" counties are predominantly urban,
while the 17 "nonrestrictive CCW/lower crime rate" counties
are predominantly rural, thus leaving open the possibility
that several factors other than CCWs could account for
the crime rate differences.
The third published study on CCWs and their effects
on crime rates (McDowall, Loftin and Wiersema 1995),
examined the impact of more lenient CCWs and firearm
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homicide rates in Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville, Florida
("shall issue" CCWs since October 1987), Jackson,
Mississippi ("shall issue" CCWs since July 1990), and
Portland, Oregon ("shall issue" CCWs since January 1990),
by examining U.C.R- data for these cities before and after
the "shall issue" laws went into effect.

Tampa and

Jacksonville were analyzed for 177 months before the "shall
issue" law, and 63 after it.

Miami was analyzed 120 months

before and 63 months after, Jackson 210 months before and
30 months after, and Portland 204 months before and 36
months after.
Firearm homicides were used as the measurement of CCWs '
effect on crime rates, as this study's design is based
in part, on the findings of Wright and Rossi (criminals
may carry firearms themselves, and use them, in response
to their victim being armed), and Zimring and Cook
(assaults are often impulsive acts involving the most
readily available weapons, hence more firearm carriers,
legal or illegal, may result in more homicides).
This study produced two conclusions, one stronger than
the other, from their analyzed U.C.R. data.

The first,

and stronger conclusion, is that more lenient CCWs "do
not reduce homicides, at least in large urban areas".
The second, conclusion, is that more lenient CCWs may in
fact "raise levels of firearms murders.

Coupled with a
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lack of influence on murders by other means, the laws
thus increase the frequency of homicide (1995:203)".
Specifically, McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema found gun
homicides increased an average of 26%, with Miami plus
3%, Jacksonville plus 75%, Tampa plus 22%, Portland
minus 12%, and Jackson plus 43%.

Non-gun homicides

decreased an average of .2%, with Miami minus 8%,
Jacksonville plus 36%, Tampa plus 17%, Portland minus 24%,
and Jackson minus 22% (1995:205).
Possible limitations to McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema's
study includes the selection of the Florida cities studied,
and restricting the impact of "shall issue" CCWs by
analyzing gun-homicides only.

Specifically, while gun

homicides increased in the three Florida cities studied,
and non-gun homicides increased in two of the three Florida
cities studied, the total homicide rate for the state of
Florida decreased every year after the state's "shall
issue" law went into effect, thus suggesting that the
results in the three cities studied may not be
representative of the entire state (Polsby 1995a).
Interestingly, while the McDowall, Loftin and Wiersema
study's gun homicide analysis tested and supported the
Zimring and Cook gun density concept, some parts of the
paper did not support it, as few CCW owners misused their
guns to commit crimes (McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema
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1995).

Other sources also reflect this rare "abuse"

of CCWs.

A 1995 fax from the Florida Division of Licensing

(see copy in "Appendixes") shows 285,641 CCWs being issued
from October 1987 to May 1995, with only 48, or less than
.02%, being revoked due to the CCW holder using a firearm
to commit a crime.

A Nexus search could not find "a single

case, anywhere in the country, of someone who was legally
carrying a concealed handgun using that weapon in a
criminal homicide (Polsby 1995b:215)", nor could Nevada
law enforcement officials recall a fatal shooting occurring
under similar circumstances in the state (Puit and Flanagan
1996).
The fourth and latest study to examine CCWs and their
effects on crime rates, Lott and Mustard (1997), based
their cross-sectional time-series analysis on U.C.R. data
for each of the nation's 3,054 counties from 1977 to 1992,
and additional data on conviction rates, sentence lengths,
and CCW permits per county from every state's department
of corrections. State Attorney Generals, State Secretary
of State, and State Police offices.
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The deterrent effect of CCWs is most pronounced in the
highest crime counties.

It was also found that criminals
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substituted violent crimes with an increase in property
crimes which involve minimal criminal-victim contact, and
this displacement of crime is most noted in the largest
population counties.
Specifically, Lott and Mustard (1997) found that when
a state's concealed handgun laws went into effect in a
county, murders fell by 8.5 percent, and rapes and
aggravated assaults fell by 5 and 7 percent, on average.
Using derived coefficients, Lott and Mustard concluded
that if states without "shall issue" CCW laws had adopted
them in 1992, approximately 1,570 murders, 4,177 rapes,
60,363 aggravated assaults, and 11,898 robberies would
have been avoided that year.

Conversely, there would have

been 247,165 more property crimes in 1992 (a 2.7%
increase).

Finally, this study estimates the financial

gain from allowing CCWs to be over $6,214 billion in 1992
dollars ($6.6 billion in savings from reduced violent
crimes minus $417 million from increased property crimes),
based on National Institute of Justice estimates on what
different types of crimes "cost" society.
Limitations to Lott and Mustard's CCW study include
questions regarding the study's problematic values assigned
to counties whose U.C.R. data was missing or not reported.
Additionally, Florida's U.C.R. data in itself, may have
skewed the entire study's analysis towards its "CCW-crime
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deterrence" conclusion, as some critics claim CCW's
reduction on crime to have been significant only in
Florida, and insignificant in every other CCW state.
In summary, four studies have been published regarding
the possible effects of more lenient CCW laws on various
crime rates, and all four have varying conclusions.

The

first study found more lenient CCW laws may or may not
reduce homicide rates, but definitely will not increase
the rates.

The second study found the greater the

prevalence of CCW ownership, the less the violent crime
rate.

The third study found that more lenient CCW laws

do not decrease certain homicides, and may actually
increase their rate.

Finally, the fourth study found more

lenient CCW laws result in a decrease in violent crimes,
with criminal activity displaced by an increase in property
crimes.
LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS

Published studies regarding private firearm ownership
and CCWs and their possible effects on crime rates have
been reviewed from several different aspects.

Theories

and empirical studies regarding deterrence, self-defense,
motives for ownership, and density have individually and
collectively yielded no consensus.

For each study finding

a positive or negative effect on crime, another exists
with conflicting or neutral findings.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES & QUESTIONS
The previous Literature review showed a multitude of
studies that addressed private legal firearm ownership
and CCWs, and their various possible relationships to crime
and victimization.

These studies have viewed firearm

ownership or CCWs as an independent variable that may
positively or negatively effect crime or victimization,
which is the dependent variable.
Some studies show that armed citizens routinely use
firearms in numerous acts of self-defense and directly
thwart their assailants during attempted criminal acts.
These studies suggest that more armed citizens will result
in less crimes successfully completed.
Other studies show that armed citizens deter crime by
having increased their level of real or perceived physical
guardianship, and thus make themselves less attractive
or vulnerable to the "rational decision-making" criminal.
These studies suggest that more armed citizens inhibit
or deter criminals, and thus will result in less crimes

40

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

attempted.
However, some studies show that armed citizens only
displace criminal activity to those citizens who are
unarmed, or to those types of crimes that involve minimal
or no victim contact.

These studies suggest that more

armed citizens will result in less crime in the armed
community, but higher crime in a neighboring unarmed
community, or less violent crimes, but more property
crimes.
Conversely, some studies have found that more armed
citizens increase crime as greater gun density results
in more criminal acts among the citizens themselves.
Still other studies suggest that more armed citizens
or the perception of more armed citizens will increase
crime as criminals will now arm themselves for "protection'
and may even adopt a "shoot first" attitude.
In short, within all of the studies reviewed, CCWs can
be viewed as resulting in more real or perceived armed
citizens in public settings, and along with it, any
resulting positive or negative, direct or indirect effects
on different crimes.

Accordingly, the following research

hypothesis will be evaluated in the current study;
"More CCWs will influence crime rates in Las Vegas"

In evaluating this hypothesis, a number of other
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research questions derived from the past literature review
must also be addressed.

These include the types of crimes

affected by CCWs, the reasons why these crime rates are
affected by CCWs, and the nature and magnitude of
displacement.

For example, if more CCWs decrease crime,

which crimes are decreased, and how are they decreased,
by increased acts of self-defense, by increased deterrence,
or by a combination of these two avenues?

Additionally,

if more CCWs decrease certain crimes, will displacement
occur where other crimes increase, or will the same
crimes increase in non-CCW communities?

Alternatively,

if more CCWs increase crime, which crimes are increased,
and how are they increased, by CCW owners committing crimes
themselves, by more criminals arming themselves in response
to their perception of CCW citizens, or by a combination
of these two avenues?

Also, if more CCWs increase certain

crimes, will displacement occur where certain other crimes
decrease?

Finally, do more CCWs provide any benefits or

risks other than a possible decrease or increase in certain
crimes?

These questions will be addressed as part of this

study's analysis.
Some of the previously reviewed studies do not support
either the possible benefits of firearm ownership (i.e.
firearm use for self-defense, a firearm deterrent effect,
etc.), or the possible risks of firearm ownership (i.e.
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"gun density", "weapons effect", etc.).

These studies

would in part help support a null hypothesis in finding
that CCWs have no measurable effect on crime rates.
The results of data analysis directed at evaluating
the impact of CCW ownership and crime rates is discussed
in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY

To determine if Nevada's new CCW law has had any effect
on crime rates in Las Vegas, data from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's U.C.R.s were analyzed for Las Vegas,
and 24 other "shall issue" cities, which served as
"controls".

Any crime-increasing or crime-decreasing

change in these cities, after initiation of their new CCW
law, would support the hypothesis that "more CCWs will
influence crime rates."
This analysis was two fold.

First, Las Vegas and the

24 "shall issue" CCW control cities were each examined
comparing a five year average of their annual U.C.R.
"violent crime" rates before adoption of their new CCW
criteria versus a violent crime rate average after
adoption. This post-CCW violent crime rate average was
based on one to five years of annual U.C.R. data, depending
on when a city's individual state adopted "shall issue"
criteria.

Hence, Las Vegas ("shall issue" since 1995)

would have a post-CCW violent crime average based on one

44
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year, while Nashville's ("shall issue" since 1994) average
would be based on two years data, Atlanta ("shall issue"
since 1989) would be based the maximum five years data
(1989-1994), etc..

Multi-year averages of each city's

pre and post-CCW violent crime rates were used in this
analysis due to many of the cities not having reported
data in the U.C.R. for a particular year/years.

This first

phase analysis gives a general idea of whether more lenient
CCW laws resulted in more or less violent crime in Las
Vegas and its control "shall issue" cities.
The second phase of this analysis was a more detailed
analysis of U.C.R. crime rates, involving Las Vegas and
five of the 24 "shall issue" cities previously examined.
These five "control" cities were selected on the following
basis:

(1) having no missing or incomplete annual U.C.R.

data, (2) having at least two years post-CCW data, and
(3) having some similarity to Las Vegas in respect to size,
urbanization, and economy.

This analysis entailed,

comparisons of crime rates in Las Vegas and each of the
five control cities on an annual basis starting five years
pre-CCW, and ending one to five years post-CCW, depending
on when each city's individual state adopted their CCW
law.

Separately examined in this analysis were the violent

crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assaults,
and the property crimes of burglary and motor vehicle
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theft.

As opposed to the first phase of analysis involving

24 control cities and violent crime rate averages, this
second phase of analysis: (1) examined specific types of
crimes, so it could be determined if the more lenient CCW
laws affect certain crimes and not others, (2) better
isolated Las Vegas' CCW status as possibly affecting
crime rates, as the control cities now have similarities
to Las Vegas' size, urbanization, and economy, and (3)
examined Las Vegas and its control cities annually over
a period of several years, so any pre-existing (i.e. a
pre-CCW) crime increase or decrease trend could be
detected, thus suggesting any post-CCW crime rate change
may be a continuance from a separate influence from the
"shall issue" CCW law itself.
In effect, the total analysis for this study started
with a general analysis of violent crime rate averages,
pre-CCW versus post-CCW, involving Las Vegas with 24 other
"shall issue" cities serving as "controls", and then led
to a more detailed analysis of specific violent and
property crimes on an annual basis pre and post-CCW, for
Las Vegas and five selected control cities. Taken together,
a clearer picture should emerge of whether more CCWs in
Las Vegas influence crime rates in any way.
Finally, a survey was administered to Las Vegas area
CCW applicants who had successfully completed their CCW
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A total of 150 of these surveys were distributed between
October 1 and November 29, 1996 to four different randomly
selected CCW instructors, who had agreed to administer
them to their CCW students upon successfully completing
their courses.

These CCW classes varied somewhat depending

on the particular instructor, but generally consisted of
between 6-12 students, with the classes being held once
or twice a month depending on enrollment.

The instructors

subsequently collected a total of 101 surveys in various
stages of completion, and held them for me to collect and
eventually analyze for results.
A copy of the survey's May 23rd "approval letter", the
survey itself, and its results appears in the "Appendixes".
Analysis of the survey results is covered in Chapter 7.
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

In selecting cities to serve as the 24 "shall issue"
control cities to Las Vegas for the first phase of analysis,
cities from all "shall issue" states in the country were
considered.

Currently, 31 states issue CCWs under more
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lenient "shall issue" laws (see "Appendixes" for a complete
list), however Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Texas have only been "shall issue since 1996.

As the

latest U.C.R. data available is 1995, these four states
had to be eliminated from inclusion.

New Hampshire,

Alabama, Washington, and Connecticut adopted "shall issue"
CCW laws relatively early (1923, 1936, 1961, and 1968
respectively), and as such, seemed inconsistent with the
other "shall issue" states who revised their CCW criteria
in the 1980s and 1990s.

Because of this, cities from these

states were also not included in the analysis.

Vermont

was an anomaly, never having required any type of permit
for its residents to legally carry a weapon concealed.
As
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Thus, 19 "shall issue" states besides Nevada remained.
These 19 states provided a source for selection of the
24 control cities for the first phase analysis.
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one city was selected from each of these 19 states.

The

basis for each city's selection was that it be a major
urban city for that state, with an economy somewhat
dependent on tourism.
The selected 24 control cities, and the date their
individual state adopted "shall issue" criteria were;
Anchorage, Alaska (1994), Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona
(1994), Little Rock, Arkansas (1995), Fort Lauderdale,
Jacksonville and Orlando, Florida (1987), Atlanta and
Columbus, Georgia (1989), Indianapolis, Indiana (1980),
Portland, Maine (1985), Jackson, Mississippi (1990),
Billings, Montana (1991), Charlotte, North Carolina (1995),
Fargo, North Dakota (1985), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (1995),
Portland, Oregon (1990), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1989),
Sioux Falls, South Dakota (1986), Nashville and Memphis,
Tennessee (1994), Salt Lake City, Utah (1995), Wheeling,
West Virginia (1989) and Cheyenne, Wyoming (1994).
From this initial analysis of violent crime rate
averages involving 24 control cities ^ five cities were
subsequently selected for the more in depth annual crime
rate analysis (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary and motor vehicle theft) along with Las Vegas.
These cities' selection was based on a number of
characteristics.
First, all five cities had to have at least two years
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of post-CCW U.C.R. data available.

Only one year of

post-CCW data may be too short of a period to really detect
any possible effect, since (1) the CCW law may have been
enacted late in the initial adoption year,

(2) there may

have been a "lag" period following adoption before any
change occurred, or (3) any one year may have been just
a "blip" that was inconsistent within a more meaningful
four or five year crime rate trend.

It should be noted

that while Las Vegas adopted "shall issue" criteria late
in 1995 (October), almost half of its current CCWs had
been issued earlier that year, due to a more lenient "may
issue" criteria adopted by new incoming Sheriff Jerry
Keller (Vogel 1995).

In short the analysis of Las Vegas

is based on one full year of data.
Second, all five cities selected had to have complete
U.C.R. data available for all years analyzed.

Florida

for example, did not report U.C.R. data for 19 88.

As this

analysis required more precision due to its design
consisting of annual crime rates (as opposed to averages)
being examined for a decrease or increase as a result of
adopting "shall issue" laws, extrapolating missing U.C.R.
data would have been inappropriate.
If the first two characteristics were met, the third
through fifth characteristics all had to do with "matching
up" with Las Vegas if possible.

Specifically, the
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remaining five cities were to be similar in size, urban
development, and to have had in part, a "tourism" economy.
This was important as crime rates can often vary depending
on the size of the community, whether it is rural or urban,
or its local economy (see Table 1).
The
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MEASUREMENT OF CONCEPTS

The general U.C.R. category of "violent crime" was used
for the first phase of analysis, while the individual
violent crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault were used for the more detailed second phase of
analysis.

These U.C.R. crime categories were selected

as measurements of CCWs' possible effects, as these crimes
can and do occur in open public places, where real or
perceived armed CCW citizens may interact.

Tardiff,

Marzuk and Leon (1995) found the "streets" and "other
outdoor places" to be the most frequent places of
occurrence for homicides (49.5%).

Miethe and Meier

(1994) found that among violent crimes committed by
strangers of the victim, public streets were the most
dangerous location, with approximately half of all rapes.
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robberies, and assaults occurring there.
While these violent crimes can also occur in residential
settings, the use of a legally owned firearm in such a
setting by a CCW citizen has no bearing on the CCW permit,
as the permit's only function is to allow its owner to
travel armed beyond his/her premises to most public places.
The first phase of analysis involving Las Vegas and
the 24 other "shall issue" cities was designed to be a
"quick general overview" of what effect more CCWs would
have on violent crime rates.

In this analysis, a five

year pre-CCW violent crime rate average for each city was
calculated from annual U.C.R data to be compared to a
corresponding post-CCW violent crime rate average.
The second phase of analysis required more precise
levels of measurement, and therefore the five "shall issue"
cities were selected to match Las Vegas' size, urban and
economic characteristics.

Each city's annual rate for

each studied violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault) were examined over a multi-year period.
Five years of pre-CCW annual rates were compared with one
to five years (depending on the particular city) of
post-CCW rates for each city, to see if a trend of a crime
increasing or decreasing had occurred in a city after
adopting "shall issue" CCW criteria, and to see if that
trend had existed before the adoption year (i.e. possibly
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independent of the new CCW law).
The property crimes of burglary and motor vehicle theft
were also examined for Las Vegas and the five selected
control cities in a similar manner during this second phase
of analysis.

This was done to see if displacement from

any of the selected violent crimes had occurred, as found
by Lott and Mustard (1997).
In all phases of analysis, U.C.R- data for each
specified city were used, not the municipal statistical
area (M.S.A.).

This was done to try to obtain as accurate

of an evaluation of a city as possible.
LIMITATIONS

Limitations to both phases of the U.C.R. analysis
includes having only one year of "post-CCW" data available
for Las Vegas and a number of the control cities used.
As stated earlier, data based on only a one-year period
may be highly volatile and an unstable estimate of postCCW trends.
Another limitation of this U.C.R. analysis is the
reliance on the U.C.R.s themselves.

U.C.R.s have the

limitations of consisting of only crimes that are reported
to the police, not necessarily all the crimes committed.
Additionally, changes in a city's judicial or police
policies or personnel can inflate or deflate a particular
crime as reported in the U.C.R., whether more or less of
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these crimes actually occurred.

Finally, cities and states

submit their annual crime data on a voluntary basis for
publication in the U.C.R.s., and as such, data is sometimes
unavailable for some cities in certain years due to their
decision not to participate that particular year/years.
This U.C.R. limitation may have affected the estimated
levels of crime when averaging the crime rates of the
control cities.
Limitations to the CCW survey included having obtained
the cooperation of only four CCW instructors.
been asked to participate.

Six had

The location of the

participating classrooms were Northeast Las Vegas,
Southeast Las Vegas, and Henderson.

Ideally, it would

have been desirable to have also obtained data from some
CCW classes in West Las Vegas to insure a possibly more
representative sampling of completed surveys.

This is

based on the assumption that CCW students attend classes
closest to their homes, and these non-represented areas
of town may have a different socioeconomic composition
that could result in different attitudes and experiences
towards crime and CCWs.
ANALYSIS PLAN

In examining the possible effects of more CCWs in Las
Vegas during the first phase of analysis, pre and post
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multi-year averages of violent crime rates based on U.C.R.
data were compared along with the 24 pre and post-CCW
violent crime rate averages of 24 "shall issue" control
cities.

This information is presented in Table 2-

An

increase in violent crime rates after adopting "shall
issue" CCW criteria was noted in the "Rate Change" column,
with a "+" preceding the noted increase.

A decrease in

violent crime rates after adoption of the "shall issue"
criteria was noted with a

preceding the noted decrease.

A "Rate Percentage Change" column was similarly
constructed in this same table.
* * * INSERT TABLE 2 HERE * * *

In the second, more detailed phase of analysis. Las
Vegas and five matched control "shall issue" cities were
examined over a period of years for the individual crimes
of homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
and motor vehicle theft.

Annual U.C.R. crime rates for

all six cities were plotted on a graph for each specific
crime (one graph for homicide, one graph for rape, etc.).
The "Y" axis of these graphs measured the rate per 100,000
population for a particular offense.

The "X" axis of these

graphs included the years of data, starting five years
prior to each city's adoption of "shall issue" legislation,
and ending five years afterwards (or one and two years
respectively for the newer "shall issue" cities of Las
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Vegas, and Phoenix and Nashville) .
In effect, these graphs would show any possible upward
(crime increasing), or downward (crime decreasing) trends
in crime rates prior to and after a city adopting more
lenient "shall issue" CCW legislation.

Accompanying each

of these graphs is a table which lists the actual crime
rates used in each particular graph.

These graphs and

tables are presented as Graphs 1 through 6, and Tables
3 through 8.
* * * INSERT GRAPHS 1-6 AND TABLES 3-8 HERE * * *
Finally, any effect noted from these two phases of
analysis will have to be explained

The CCW survey

previously administered will hopefully provide some
explanations for any of these findings.
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CHAPTER 6
O.C.R. ANALYSIS RESULTS

In comparing Las Vegas' violent crime rate averages
before and after adopting "shall issue" CCW criteria, it
can be seen that there was an average increase of 22%
following adoption of the "shall issue" law (see Table
2).

An increase in average violent crime rates following

adoption of more lenient CCW standards was also found in
16 of the 24 control cities.

Only five of the control

cities had a decrease following adoption of the "shall
issue" laws, and three cities had no real change (two were
plus one percent, and one was minus two percent).
The more detailed analysis of Las Vegas and the five
matched control cities (Graphs 1-6 and Tables 3-8) for
the crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault produced mixed results.

In analyzing these graphs,

caution was exercised in examining a crime rate trend
occurring prior to each city adopting its "shall issue"
criteria (i.e. an increase or decrease during years "-5"
through "-1") as this could have influenced a post-CCW
(years "0" through "+5") crime rate trend more than the
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CCW law itself.
In Las Vegas, homicide and robbery rates post-CCW seemed
extensions of their pre-CCW crime rate years, and as such,
no effects were attributable to the new CCW law.

However,

rape and aggravated assault rates appears to have "leveled
off" during the CCW year from increasing trends beginning
two years previously (years "-1" and "-2").

It should

be noted, however, that no crime rates in Las Vegas
increased or decreased more than 10% over the previous
(non-CCW) year.

No effect was noted in the displacement

crimes of burglary and motor vehicle theft in Las Vegas.
No consistent pattern was noted in comparing the control
cities.

Phoenix showed a decrease in homicide, and no

effect in any of the other crimes.

Nashville showed a

decrease in aggravated assault, and no effect for any of
the other crimes.

Portland showed an increase in

aggravated assault, and no effect in the remaining crimes.
Jackson showed an increase in all crimes except burglary.
Atlanta showed a decrease in all crimes except aggravated
assault, and these decreases typically started a year after
adopting "shall issue" status (year "+1").

In short, three

of the control cities showed little effect from adopting
more lenient CCWs standards, while one control city showed
mostly crime rate increases and another city showed mostly
crime rate decreases.
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CHAPTER 7
CCW SURVEY AND RESULTS
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The "typical" CCW applicant from this survey was white
(85%), male (80%), married (705%), between 31 and 60 years
of age (82%), had a 1995 income between $30-69,999 (65%),
and had some college, or a college degree (88%).

11% had

personally been a victim of a violent crime, and
approximately half of all those responding knew someone
who had been a violent crime victim.
Most CCWs applicants surveyed perceived violent crime
as growing, with no definite control of this problem coming
from local law enforcement.

Specifically, almost three

quarters of all those responding felt violent crimes had
increased over the last three years in Las Vegas, and will
continue to do so.

Only 7% felt local law enforcement

would be "very effective" in controlling these crimes (50%
responded "somewhat effective, and 25% responded "not
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effective at all").
Conversely, most CCW applicants in this survey felt
obtaining a CCW and being able to be armed in public was
a viable response to this growing violent crime problem.
Specifically, all (100%) of those responding included
"self-defense" as one of the reasons for owning a firearm,
and 95% mentioned "security" as one of the reasons for
applying for a CCW.

Almost three quarters (74%) plan on

carrying a handgun on themselves on a daily basis, and
87% plan on practicing with it on a monthly basis.

Almost

two thirds (64%) felt that Nevada's CCW laws "will stop
local criminals from attempting violent crimes for fear
of being shot", and 94% felt that the average armed CCW
citizen would be either "very effective" or "somewhat
effective" in defending him/herself if involved in a
violent crime.
While the majority of Nevada CCW applicants may feel
that obtaining a CCW is a rational response to crime, and
provides a feeling of safety or security, this may not
necessarily be a feeling shared by others in the community.
Hemenway, Solnick and Azrael (1995) found that 85% of
non-gun owners would feel less safe if more people in their
community acquired guns, while only 8% would feel more
safe, and 6% would feel the same.

Among gun owners, 41%

would feel less safe, 40% more safe, and 19% would feel
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the same.

Among all people surveyed, 71% would feel less

safe, 19% would feel more safe, and 10% would feel the
same.
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CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION

The results from the first phase of analysis for Las
Vegas (Table 2) and the second phase (Graphs 1-6 and Tables
3-8) seem in conflict with each other, with the first
phase finding Las Vegas' violent crime rate average to
have increased 22% following adoption of "shall issue"
CCW criteria, and the second phase finding decreases in
the violent crimes rates of rape and aggravated assault
and no effect on any of the other violent crimes following
adoption of the new CCW laws.

A possible explanation for

this discrepancy may lie with the use of mathematical
averages in comparing pre and post-CCW effects of analysis
in Table 2.
Specifically, averaging five years of annual pre-CCW
rates does not show if there was a increasing trend in
annual violent crime rates during this period that "carried
over" into the post-CCW period for Las Vegas.

Upon

initial analysis of Table 2, Las Vegas shows a violent
crime rate average of 1200 per 100,000 after adopting
"shall issue" CCW standards in 1995.

The average violent

62

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63.

crime rate pre-CCW for Las Vegas was 935 per 100,000, based
on a five years average of the annual violent crime rates
preceding 1995.

However, these five years from 1990 to

1994 show violent crime rates to have been progressively
increasing during those years; 732 in 1990, 862 in 1991,
888 in 1992, 940 in 1993, and 1251 in 1994.

Thus, Las

Vegas' post-CCW rate is actually a decrease (from the five
preceding years of pre-CCW violent crime increase).

This

seems more consistent with the second phase of analysis,
which showed Las Vegas' rates of rape and aggravated
assault leveling off from previous pre-CCW trends of
increase.
Fifteen of the 24 control cities in Table 2 also seem
to have had their post-CCW averages influenced by a pre-CCW
trend of violent crime increase or decrease.

Excluding

the cities of Oklahoma City, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City
which had only a 1-2% change in their pre and post-CCW
averages, and Indianapolis which had too many years of
missing U.C.R. data to assess a pre-CCW trend, only six
cities showed their violent crime rate averages to have
changed without a pre-existing violent crime rate
trend.

These six cities were; Columbus, Fort Lauderdale,

Jackson, Pittsburgh, Portland, Maine (all showed an
increase following adoption of "shall issue") and Little
Rock (which showed a decrease).
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A supplemental analysis of the violent crime rate
averages was conducted for Las Vegas and all 24 control
cities to assess how the compilation of averages may have
affected the results (see Table 9).

Specifically, the

pre-CCW violent crime rate averages used in Table 2 were
based on the annual violent crime rates for each city in
the years "-1" through "-5", and the post-CCW violent crime
rate averages used in Table 2 were based on the annual
violent crime rates for each city in the years "+1" through
"+5", while Table 9 shows the crime rate for each year
used to obtain these pre and post-CCW averages.

Thus,

Table 9 can show whether changes were occurring in a city's
crime rate prior to its CCW law taking effect.
* * * INSERT TABLE 9 HERE * * *
While the analysis thus far reveals that rape and
aggravated assault rates decreased, and the other crime
rates were unaffected as a possible result of more lenient
CCW laws in Las Vegas in 19 95 (its first and only "shall
issue" year U.C.R. data was available for), the question
remains, "What happened to crime rates in non-CCW ("may
issue") cities during 1995?"

In other words, is it

possible that Las Vegas' crime rate changes or no changes
in 1995 were a result of a non-CCW variable that can be
seen in a city without "shall issue" CCW laws in 1995.
To examine this possibility, separate analysis by
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specific crimes were conducted in Las Vegas and the "may
issue" control cities of Denver, San Antonio, New Orleans,
Sacramento, and San Francisco.

These "may issue" control

cities were selected on essentially the same criteria as
the "shall issue" control cities.

In effect, the "may

issue" control cities had no missing annual U.C.R. data,
and had similarities to Las Vegas regarding size, urban
development, and tourism (see Table 1).
These tables and graphs examined annual crime rates
over a ten year period of 1985 through 1995, as obviously
the "may issue" control cities did not have a pre or postCCW period.

Instead, the analysis here is to see if Las

Vegas' crime rates followed a similar trend to non-CCW/"may
issue" cities.
* * * INSERT GRAPHS 7-12 AND TABLES 10-15 HERE * * *
As revealed in Graphs 7 through 12 and Tables 10 through
15, Las Vegas' crime rates generally follow the ten year
trends of three to four of the control cities, especially
in 1995 (Las Vegas' "shall issue" year).

Hence, the

analysis indicates that the decrease in rape and aggravated
assault rates in Las Vegas during the first year of the
changes in CCW criteria are similar to trends in the
majority of the other (non-CCW) cities in 1995, and
therefore, are not attributable to changes in the CCW
standards made in 1995.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

From the literature review in Chapter 3 , we have seen
that theories, empirical studies, and statistics abound
in both supporting and not supporting more lenient CCW
laws and its foundation, private firearm ownership.
Some of the published research and literature, however,
seems to have reached a "compromise" from these two
different sides.

That is, they have concluded that while

more lenient CCWs (and for that matter, less firearm
restrictions in general for law abiding citizens) can not
be shown to reduce crime, they by the same token can not
be shown to directly contribute to crime either.

It is

this viewpoint that my own Las Vegas CCW U.C.R. analysis
supports.
In analyzing U.C.R. data for Las Vegas, each detected
change in crime possibly attributable to adopting "shall
issue" CCW standards in 1995, was subsequently rejected
by a closer, different analysis.

The net effect was that

no increase or decrease in crime rates could be firmly
seen as a result of more lenient CCWs in Las Vegas.

66
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The lack of any effect on crime rates could be a result
of Las Vegas having only relaxed its CCW standards since
1995, as the cities of Atlanta, Georgia ("shall issue"
since 1989) and Jackson, Mississippi ("shall issue" since
1990) both show more definite effects of adopting these
laws.

Atlanta showed general decreases, or the leveling

off of increasing crime trends, usually beginning in its
second year of "shall issue" analysis.

Jackson on the

other hand, generally showed increases in crime rates,
usually immediately after adopting its "shall issue" CCW
criteria.
Besides being relatively new, with only one year of
"shall issue" CCW data to analyze, the lack of a more
attributable effect on crime from CCWs in Las Vegas could
be a result of a number of other factors.

First, with

less than one percent of Las Vegas' one million residents
having a CCW, perhaps there simply are not enough people
with CCWs to make any real impact, either in decreasing
or increasing crime.
Second, while 74% of the applicants from the CCW
survey plan on being armed on a daily basis, it can be
questioned whether this many actually will do so.

Given

the bulk, size and inconvenience of carrying a handgun
concealed, many CCW owners may be unarmed when actually
confronted by an antagonist.
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Third, perhaps those who typically obtain CCWs are also
less likely to be victims of violent crimes.

Specifically,

white, male, middle aged, middle income, college educated
people (the profile generated from the CCW survey) may
be less likely to be victimized than women or those of
a lower socioeconomic group.
Fourth, perhaps a lack of "publicity" has slowed a more
dramatic effect that could have resulted in Las Vegas with
its new law.

The previously mentioned defensive firearm

training program for females in Orlando, Florida was highly
publicized by its local media, and rape did decline
significantly (60-90%), with possible displacement.
A fifth possible explanation is that the many changes
that regularly occur within any community (i.e. changes
in the size and focus of local law enforcement, changes
in the judicial system and the focus and definition of
different crimes, changes in the levels in gang activity,
illegal drug sales and use, the economy, tourism, etc.),
may simply overshadow the impact of CCW ownership on crime
rates.
A final possible explanation, is that perhaps more CCWs
do reduce violent crime rates (via acts of self-defense
or deterrence), but at the same time, they also serve as
a stimulus ("weapons effect") to initiate more crime.
The net result would be no measurable effect.
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If CCWs have had for the most part, no conclusive
effects on crime, what do they provide for their owners
or applicants?

From the CCW survey presented in Chapter

7, the answer seems to be a "sense of security".
Stated simply, CCW applicants feel safer by obtaining the
right to be legally armed in public.
These conclusions do not necessarily imply that this
CCW provided "sense of security" is a "false sense of
security".

In fact, Wright (1995) points out that the

fear of crime or victimization is not only based on reality
in our society, but is equally important, a very real
feeling to many people.

Firearm ownership and CCWs may

help alleviate this fear, just as many less "controversial"
methods may do (home security alarm systems, guard dogs,
pepper sprays, etc.).

Wright philosophically asks, "Does

a society that is manifestly incapable of protecting its
citizens from crime and predation really have the right
or moral authority to tell people what they may or may
not do to protect themselves? (1995:65)".

This question

may have special significance when remembering that the
incidence of CCW owners "misusing" their legally carried
handgun to commit a crime is extremely rare.
Thus for many people, CCWs and private firearm
ownership may provide a reduction in the fear of crime
that is no longer obtainable from the more formal social
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controls of the criminal justice system.

Applicable to

this conclusion, are the previously mentioned CCW survey
results and the previously mentioned findings of Smith
and Uchida (1988), that firearm ownership (and thus
perhaps CCWs) is a form of "self-help" based on perceived
vulnerability to crime, and is inversely related to a
perceived ineffectiveness of the police.

Also applicable

is the previously mentioned work of Young, McDowall and
Loftin (1987) that found firearm ownership inversely
related to the owners' confidence in the criminal
justice system.

However, if this feeling of more security

benefits the psyche of the gun or CCW owner against
crime, it may have to be weighed against the feelings of
less security experienced by other citizens in the
community to them (Hemenway et al 1995).
In conclusion, this paper is in support of the
null hypothesis that, "CCWs have no measurable effect on
crime rates".

More research addressing the policy

implications of Nevada's "shall issue" law in Las Vegas
should be undertaken in the future.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROL CITIES

CITY
Las Vegas
Nashville
Portland, OR
Jackson
Atlanta
Phoenix
Denver
San Antonio
New Orleans
San Francisco
Sacramento

(1990)
POPULATION
258,204
488,374
438,002
395,396
393,929
983,403
467,610
935,393
496,938
723,959
369,365

TOTAL HOUSING
UNITS
109,670
219,521
198,319
79,352
182,754
422,036
239,636
327,403
225,573
328,471
153,362

% ECONOMY
SERVICE
48.57%
37.07%
37.04%
39.59%
39.77%
33.27%
39.34%
36.82%
44.66%
41.91%
34.05%

All data from Facts About Cities by Allan Carpenter, 1996
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TABLE 2
VIOLENT CRIME RATE AVERAGES PER 100,000
PRE & POST "SHALL ISSUE" CCW

CITY
Las Vegas
Anchorage
Atlanta
Billings
Charlotte
Cheyenne
Columbus
Fargo
Ft Lauderdale
Indianaplois
Jackson
Jacksonville
Little Rock
Memphis
Nashville
Oklahoma City
Orlando
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland, ME
Portland, OR
Salt Lake City
Sioux Falls
Tucson
Wheeling

PRE-CCW
V.C. RATE

POST-CCW
V.C. RATE

RATE
CHANGE

935
701
2904
158
2088
184
449
126
1202
813
71 7
1 095
2846
1466
1481
1286
191 4
1065
1106
803
2222
802
190
973
271

1200
984
3984
99
1696
201
530
99
1497
875
1288
1638
2046
1669
1794
1293
2284
1074
1222
900
1837
782
258
11 56
432

+ 265
+ 283
+ 1080
-59
-392
+ 17
+ 81
-27
+ 295
+ 62
+ 571
+ 543
-800
+ 203
+ 313
+ 07
+ 370
+ 09
+ 1 16
+ 97
-385
-20
+ 68
+ 1 83
+ 1 61
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RATE %
CHANGE
+ 22%
+ 29%
+ 27%
-37%
-1 9%
+ 08%
+ 15%
-21%
+ 20%
+ 07%
+ 44%
+ 33%
-28%
+ 12%
+ 1 7%
+ 01%
+ 16%
+ 01 %
+ 09%
+ 1 1%
-1 7%
-02%
+ 26%
+ 16%
+ 37%
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GRAPH 1
HOMICIDE PER 100,000 IN
"SHALI. ISSUE" CITIES
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TABLE 3
HOMICIDE PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES

CCW YEAR
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

LV

14.9
14.0
12.7
14.6
15.7
12.8

NA

PO

JA

AT

PH

20.1
14.0
19.9
17.5
17.3
13.4
13.8

09.4
10.8
12.8
10.0
11.8
07.5
08.9
11.6
16.9
12.5
11.7

47.1
45.4
41 .9
31 .5
37.3
22.4
23.8
23.2
25.0
15.6
18.1

46.4
50.3
48.2
50.9
58.6
57.7
48.8
48.1
41 .7
33.2
30.5

19.7
21 .5
15.2
13.6
12.9
13.0
13.4

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"NA" Nashville (1994)
"PO" Portland (1990)

"JA" Jackson (1990)
"AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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GRAPH 2
RAPE PER 100,000 IN "SHALL
ISSUE" CITIES
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TABLE 4
RAPE PER 100,000 IN "SHALL ISSUE*
CITIES

CCW YEAR
+5
4-4
4-3
4-2
4-1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

LV

72.0
76-3
60.6
57.9
66.0
60.2

NA

93.0
97.4
112.3
96.7
101.3
110.7
95.3

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"NA" Nashville (1994)
"PO" Portland (1990)

PO
92.9
86.4
105.3
106.9
103.2
97.0
97.5
96.0
104.1
118.9
127.6

JA
95.3
103.4
87.3
105.0
95.9
93.6
89.4
73.9
53.7
54.5
55.2

AT
102.6
122.1
152.6
158.3
176.4
162.0
162.0
147.9
152.8
156.6
142.7

PH

37.9
40.7
42.7
47.6
48.2
52.1
42.3

"JA" Jackson (1990)
"AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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GRAPH 3
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
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TABLE 5
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES

CCW YEAR
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

LV

468
506
498
532
486
362

NA

51 1
509
527
51 8
522
433
321

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"NA" Nashville (1994)
"PO" Portland (1990)

PO
501
506
507
586
606
581
626
937
938
1 055
954

JA
753
953
759
625
663
397
321
305
195
203
21 0

AT
1299
1500
1417
1607
1550
1594
1342
1186
121 8
1099
910

"JA" Jackson (1990)
"AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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340
321
331
314
346
344
278
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GRAPH 4
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
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TABLE 6
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000
IN "SHALL ISSUE" CITIES

CCW YEAR
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

LV

646
656
444
284
294
297

NA

PO

11 67
11 78
1 127
996
934
821
61 3

1 323
1299
1 232
1 1 28
1 085
1 1 06
1 1 58
1 1 96
1 1 83
1203
1 255

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"NA" Nashville (1994)
"PO" Portland (1990)

JA
471
580
51 4
526
408
351
280
397
429
428
382

AT

PH

21 23
2368
2241
2225
2300
21 38
2023
1 61 6
1 541
1373
1 293

670
698
757
71 6
698
675
567

"JA" Jackson (1990)
"AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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GRAPH 5
BURGLARY PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
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TABLE 7
BURGLARY PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES

CCW YEAR

LV

NA

PO

JA

AT

PH

1573
1 600
1781
1989
2034
1780
1 608

1 704
1728
1 725
1912
211 3
2050
2908
3930
3885
4678
4665

2796
3680
3567
3747
4384
3798
2850
2665
2540
2023
1889

2951
3268
3180
3439
3939
4033
3496
3472
301 9
2795
2441

1 930
1 984
1 984
2032
2432
251 0
2443

+5
+1
+3
4-2
4-1

0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

1540
1 549
1363
1 524
1 637
1 651

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"NA" Nashville (1994)
"PO" Portland (1990)

"JA" Jackson (1990)
"AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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GRAPH 6
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSDE" CITIES
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TABLE 8
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PER 100,000
IN "SHALL ISSDE" CITIES

CCW YEAR
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

LV

1007
1 028
1038
1 091
997
852

NA

PO

JA

AT

PH

1 550
1146
921
998
757
694
532

1 987
2061
1 860
1 725
1 425
1 328
1 636
21 04
1 320
1 056
921

2079
2473
2045
2031
1686
789
536
41 8
357
31 9
299

2085
2288
2057
2732
2832
2703
2093
1747
1363
993
71 9

2133
1920
1498
1498
1 667
1782
1349

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"NA" Nashville (1994)
"PO" Portland (1990)

"JA" Jackson (1990)
"AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 9
SOB-ANALYSIS OF TABLE 2 DATA
VIOLENT CRIME PER 100,000

"Shall Issue" since 1995
CCW
Year
1
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

Las
Vegas

Charlotte

Oklahoma
City

Salt
Lake City

Little
Rock

1696
1727
2300
1932
21 76
2303

1293
1403
141 7
1400
1 128
1082

782
755
823
783
803
847

2046
2954
3290
2952
2981
2054

1200
1251
940
888
862
732

"Shall Issue" since 1994
CCW
Year Anchorage Phoenix Tucson Nashville Memphis Cheyenne
2
1
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

1068
1080
1 146
1091
1106
1084
900

990
977
883
81 6
71 2
588
506

1206
1106
1023
1021
939
908
N/R

1790
1798
1784
1628
1575
1378
1038

1 769
1 568
1 634
1 553
1 422
1 488
1 233

"Shall Issue" since 1991
CCW
Year

Billings

5
4
3
2
1
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

N/R
N/R
N/R
231
99
122
137
1 69
158
203
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183
21 8
204
231
193
11 6
176
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"Shall Issue" since 1990
Year

Jackson,
Mississippi

Portland t
Oregon

5
4
3
2
1
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

1682
1402
1287
1204
864
71 4
799
703
701
666

1 902
1856
1831
1805
1 792
1 891
2240
2242
2390
2349

ccw

"Shall Issue" since 1989
CCW
Year
5
4
3
2
1
-1

-2
-3
-4
-5

Atlanta

Columbus

Pittsburgh

Wheeling

3983
3859
4041
4085
3951
3576
2999
2909
2662
2376

61 1
460
51 0
578
489
488
381
436
491
447

121 6
1202
11 53
1323
1216
1063
1110
1170
1086
1099

529
443
397
436
353
334
305
259
179
277

"Shall Issue" since 1987
CCW
Year
5
4
3
2
1
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

Fort
Lauderdale
1421
1625
1706
N/R
1235
1275
1439
1189
933
11 75

Orlando
N/R
2495
2087
N/R
2270
2342
2064
1 698
1552
191 3

Jacksonville
1760
1830
1443
N/R
1520
1298
1215
1069
936
955
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Shall Issue" since 1986
CCW
Year

-1

-2
-3
-4
-5

Sioux Falls
307
320
237
206
21 9
226
1 94
1 82
182
1 64

Shall Issue" since 1985
CCW
Year

-1

-2

-3
-4
-5

Portland
Maine
733
994
824
883
1067
848
791
697
838
843

Fargo
161
68
73
79
94
1 22

126
180
106

Shall Issue" since 1980
CCW
Year

-1

-2
-3
-4
-5

Indianapolis
926
893
938
983
637
81 3
N/R
N/R
N/R
N/R
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GRAPH 7
HOMICIDE PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
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TABLE 10
HOMICIDE PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS

YEAR

LV

DE

SA

NO

SF

SC

1995
1994
1993
1992
1 991
1990
1989
1988
1 987
1986
1 985

14.9
14.0
12.7
14.6
15.7
12.8
12.5
10.6
09.8
16.2
12.5

16.0
15.8
14.8
19.3
18.4
14.3
11.1
13.8
15.5
17.6
14.0

14.2
15.9
22.3
22.5
21 .8
22.2
17.7
15.3
18.9
18.4
20.9

74.5
85.8
80.3
55.2
68.9
61 .2
47.5
42.4
37.3
34.9
27.1

13.4
12.3
17.5
15.6
12.9
14.0
09.7
12.2
13.4
15.2
11.6

15.2
15.9
22.0
11.7
17.5
11.6
12.7
20.0
23.5
21 .9
12.5

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"DE" Denver
"SA" San Antonio

"NO" New Orleans
"SF" San Francisco
"SC" Sacramento
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TABLE 11
RAPE PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS

YEAR

LV

DE

SA

1 995
1 994
1 993
1992
1 991
1 990
1 989
1 988
1 987
1986
1 985

72.0
76.3
60.6
57.9
66.0
60.2
56.9
71 .0
64.0
69.7
60.9

63.3

65.8
56.5
56.1
63.3
73.0
45.9
50.2
57.2
92.3
91 .5
95.5

71 .6
78.9
88.7
89.1
80.2
65.7
73.9
78.7
81 .8
81 .5

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"DE" Denver
"SA" San Antonio

NO
100.0
88.3

60.6
56.8
60.3
72.6
73.4
74.9
65. 3
80.9
80.3

SF

SC

41 .2
39.4
49.0
52.6
54.1
57.9
50.6
60.1
58.9
65.5
69.8

42.0
44.7
43.2
61 .9
58.6
57.1
53.9
55.2
72.6
80.6
66.8

"NO" New Orleans
"SF" San Francisco
"sc" Sacramento
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GRAPH 9
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
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TABLE 12
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE'
CITIES & LAS VEGAS

YEAR

LV

DE

SA

1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1 989
1988
1 987
1986
1985

468
506
498
532
486
362
382
369
382
417
384

279
335
374
366
341
281
256
279
316
405
374

235
278
302
358
395
306
285
306
354
371
31 1

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"DE" Denver
"SA" San Antonio

NO

SF

1098
976
1053
1058
1192
121 7
1031
879
689
91 6
738

876
893
1 1 48
1 1 02
950
974
666
646
606
678
697

SC
566
589
597
606
605
485
476
473
555
691
666

"NO" New Orleans
"SF" San Francisco
"SC" Sacramento
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GRAPH 10
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000 IN
"MAY ISSUE" CITIES & LAS VEGAS
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TABLE 13
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000 IN
"MAY ISSUE" CITIES & LAS VEGAS

YEAR

LV

DE

SA

NO

SF

SC

1 995
1 994
1 993
1 992
1 991
1990
1 989
1988
1 987
1 986
1 985

646
656
444
284
294
297
312
337
351
349
336

503
498
586
602
601
524
389
360
343
393
360

203
293
302
289
302
238
200
186
1 97
228
198

960
737
845
81 2
869
908
778
662
606
594
61 9

546
51 6
600
651
629
665
61 3
564
532
508
517

515
557
592
540
61 8
524
51 1
503
505
530
431

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"DE" Denver
"SA" San Antonio

"NO" New Orleans
"SF" San Francisco
"SC" Sacramento
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GRAPH 11
BDRGLARY PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE'
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
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TABLE 14
BURGLARY PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS

YEAR

LV

DE

SA

NO

SF

SC

1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985

1540
1549
1 363
1524
1 637
1 651
1682
1755
1 952
1960
21 84

1465
151 8
1 831
1806
1915
1 997
2078
2306
2690
331 3
3208

1396
1 642
1 81 3
2258
2609
2780
2998
2957
3591
3320
2843

21 01
2037
2275
21 72
2476
2742
2445
2290
21 83
2050
1 850

965
1086
1 51 5
1576
1435
1467
1424
1346
1256
1342
1 603

21 29
2074
2089
1 907
2056
1 886
21 55
2262
2653
311 7
31 87

IILV" Las Vegas (1995)
IIDE" Denver
IISA" San Antonio

"NO" New Orleans
"SF" San Francisco
"SC" Sacramento
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GRAPH 12
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PER 100,000 IN
"MAY ISSUE" CITIES & LAS VEGAS
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TABLE 15
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PER 100,000 IN
"MAY ISSUE" CITIES & LAS VEGAS

YEAR

LV

DE

SA

NO

SF

SC

1 995
1 994
1 993
1992
1 991
1 990
1 989
1 988
1 987
1 986
1 985

1007
1028
1038
1091
997
852
854
809
763
675
670

1036
1222
151 6
1 641
1213
1269
1 138
994
1 073
1273
983

842
988
1 1 97
151 3
1508
1590
1607
141 1
1480
925
870

201 8
1734
1 942
1807
1975
2443
21 70
1799
1 630
1679
1 1 92

11 23
1247
1501
1687
161 1
1569
1288
1270
1 006
91 0
809

21 24
2271
2038
21 35
2004
1773
1940
1696
11 65
1001
932

"LV" Las Vegas (1995)
"DE" Denver
"SA" San Antonio

"NO" New Orleans
"SF" San Francisco
"SC" Sacramento
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"SHALL ISSUE" STATES AND YEAR OF ADOPTION

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Alabama 1936
Alaska 1994
Arizona 1994
Arkansas 199 5
Connecticut 1968
Florida 1987
Georgia 1989
Idaho 19 90 (revised 1995)
Indiana 1980
Kentucky 1996
Louisiana 1996
Maine 1985
Mississippi 1990
Montana 1991
Nevada 1995
New Hampshire 1923
North Carolina 1995
North Dakota 1985
Oklahoma 1995
Oregon 1990
Pennsylvania 1989 (Philadelphia included 1995)
South Carolina 199 6
South Dakota 1986
Tennessee 1994
Texas 1995 (enacted 1996)
Utah 1995
Vermont (no license required)
Virginia 1988 (revised 1995)
Washington 19 61
West Virginia 1989
Wyoming 1994
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FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Sandra B. Mordiam
S^cw«7iry<rfSt*t«
DIVISION OF nCENSING
Post 0£Sc« Box 6687
TaOahasseff, Horida 32314-6687
FAX (904) 487-7930

CONCEALED WEAPONS/FIREARMS LICENSE
STATISTICAL REPORT TOR
PERIOD 10/01/87 - 05/31/95
TOTAL

o

293,945

Applications Received:
New

201,999
91,946

Renewal
o

28 5, 64 1

Licenses Issued:
New

194,146
91,495

Renewal

o

Licenses Valid

o

Applications Denied:

159,118
1,306

Criminal History
Incomplete Application
o

675
531

License Revoked;

549

Clemency Rule Change or
Legislative Change

66

Illegible Prints With No
Response

10

Crime Prior To Licensure

157

Crime After Licensure

286

- Firearm Utilized
Other

--48
20

Reinstated

87*

♦Statistics regarding number of licenses reinstated were net
maintained trior to Jar.uar--- 1990.
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Dear CCW applicant;
Congratulations on successfully completing your CCW/handgun
qualification course.
While CCWs have recently gained in popularity both
nationally and in Nevada, little is known about the
applicants and their attitudes towards these new laws.
As such, I am asking for your cooperation and participation
in completing the following survey to more accurately gauge
the opinions and attitudes of current Nevada CCW
applicants.
Your honest and candid answers would be greatly
appreciated, and are strictly voluntary and anonymous.
Results of this survey will be presented to the criminal
justice graduate department at UNLV as part of my Master's
thesis.
Please return your completed survey to your CCW classroom
instructor.
Thank you for your help on this project.
If you have any
questions regarding this survey or its results, I may be
contacted through the UNLV criminal justice department
at 895-0236.

Sincerely,

Gary Yuen
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The first set of questions concerns you and your CCW;
Q-1.

Prior to considering obtaining your CCW, did you
own a handgun?
N o ................
Yes...............
Total

Q-2.

101 (100%)

Other than your CCW handgun, do you own any other
firearms, including rifles and shotguns?
No................
Yes...............
Total

Q-3.

08 (08%)
93 (92%)

22 (22%)
79 (78%)
101 (100%)

Why do you own a firearm/firearms?
apply.

Mark all that

Self-defense....................... .
Hunting............................ .
Formal and informal target shooting.
Collecting..........................
Hobby...............................
Other (specify).....................
Total................................

1 01
41
72
26
37
10

(100%)
(41%)
(71%)
(26%)
(37%)
(10%)*

101
1 01 (100%)

*"Other" responses include; freedom (1), work
(4), competition (1), I love guns (1), instructor
(1), defend against government (1), and
heirloom (1 ).

Q-4.

Prior to completing your CCW/handgun defense
course, had you ever completed any other defensive
firearms courses?
No.......... .....
Yes......... ......
Total.... ......

52 (52%)
48 (48%)
100 (100%)
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0-5,

Do you plan on taking any additional
defensive-firearms courses within the next year?
N o ................
Yes...............
Total.........

Q-6.

43 (43%)
57 (57%)
100 (100%)

Upon receiving your CCW, how often will you
actually carry your handgun?
Almost every day...............
Once or twice a week..........
Once or twice a month.........
A few times a year, or less....
Total.......................

Q-7.

74
12
09
05

(74%)
(12%)
(09%)
(05%)

100 (1 00%)

Prior to obtaining your CCW, did you ever carry
a handgun concealed in a public place?
Yes, almost every day..............
Yes, once or twice a week...........
Yes, once or twice a month..........
Yes, a few times ayear, or less....
No, never...........................
Total

17
07
08
16
53

(17%)*
(07%)
(08%)
(16%)
(52%)

101

(100%)

*2 of these responses noted that they had
been a police officer, or had a previous
CCW while living in Florida.

0-8.

Upon receiving your CCW, how often will you
actually practice with your handgun?
At least
once a week...............
At least
once a month...............
A few times a year or less.........
Total

35 (35%)
52 (51%)
14 (14%)
101
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Q-9.

Prior to applying for your CCW, how often did you
actually practice with your handgun?
At least once a
week...............
At least once a month..............
A few times a year or less..........
Total

27 (27%)
37 (38%)
35 (35%)
99 (100%)

The next set of questions involves your experiences and
thoughts on crime in Las Vegas, and CCWs.
Q-10.

Have you been a victim of a violent or potentially
violent crime (robbery, assault, etc.) within the
last two years?
N o ...................
Yes
Total

90 (89%)
11 (11%)
101

(100%)

If "yes" to Q-10, was it reported to the police?
N o ....................
Yes...................
Total..............

Q-11.

02 (18%)
09 (82%)
11 (100%)

Do you personally know someone who has been a
victim of a violent or potentially violent crime
(robbery, assault, rape, etc.) within the last two
years?
No ...................
Yes..................
Total

48 (47i%)
53 (52i%)
101

(100%)

If "yes" to Q-11 , was it reported to the police?
N o ....................
Yes...................
Total..............

03 (06%)
45 (94%)
48 (100%)
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Q-12.

Do you think the level of violent crimes (assault,
robbery, rape) in Las Vegas has increased,
decreased, or stayed the same over the last three
years?
It has increased.........
It has decreased.........
It has stayed the same...
Don't know...............
Total.................

Q-13.

Total..................

101 (100%)

77
05
08
10

(77%)
(05%)
(08%)
(10%)

100 (100%)

How effective has local law enforcement been in
reducing these violent crimes in Las Vegas the past
three years?
Very effective..........
Somewhat effective.....
Not effective at all....
Don't know..............
Total.................

Q-15.

(71%)
(04%)
(09%)
(16%)

Do you think the level of violent crimes (assaults,
robbery, rape) in Las Vegas will increase,
decrease, or stay the same over the next three
years?
It will increase.........
It will decrease.........
It will stay the same....
Don't know...............

Q-14.

72
04
09
16

04
53
27
16

(04%)
(53%)
(27%)
(16%)

100 (100%)

How effective do you think local law enforcement
will be in reducing these violent crimes in Las
Vegas in the next three years?
Very effective........
(07%)
Somewhat effective.... . . 50 (50%)
Not effective at al... . . 25 (25%)
Don't know............ .. 18 (18%)
Total...............

(100%)
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Q-16.

Do you think Nevada's CCW laws will stop local
criminals from attempting violent crimes for fear
of being shot?
Y e s .....................
N o ......................
Don't know..............
Total

Q-1 7.

101 (100%)

How effective in defending himself/herself will
the average armed CCW citizen be if actually
involved in a violent crime?
V e r y e f f e c t i v e ...........................
S o m e w h a t e f f e c t i v e ................
Not e ffe c tiv e a t a l l . . . .
D o n ' t k n o w ......................................
T o t a l ...............................................

Q-18.

64 (63^%)
24 (23i%)
13 (13%)

46
48
00
07

(45i%)
(47i%)
(00%)
(07%)

101 (100%)

What does receiving a CCW mean to you?
that apply.
S e c u r i t y ................................
C o n f i d e n c e ...........................
E m p o w e r m e n t ........................
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ...............
A u t h o r i t y ..............................
O t h e r ( s p e c i f y ) .............
T o t a l ...................................

Mark all

___

(100%)
(58%)
(12%)
90 (95%)
(07%)
06 (06%)*

___

95 (100%)

___

*"Other" reponses include; deterrence
(1), freedom (1), protection ( 2 ) ,
legality (1), and exercise of my
rights (1).
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Finally, a few questions about your background;
Q-19.

Are you male or female?
Male
Female..................
Total

Q-20.

81 (80%)
20 (20%)
101 (100%)

How old are you?
21-30...................
31-40...................
41-50...................
51-60...................
61 or older.............

12
24
32
25
06

Total.................

Q-21

99 (100%)

What is the highest level of education you
completed?
Some high school.......
High school graduate....
Vocational/trade school.
Some college............
College graduate.......
Advanced college degree.
Total..................

Q-22.

(12%)
(24i%)
(32&%)
(25i%)
(06%)

03
11
08
48
21
09

(03%)
(11%)
(08%)
(48%)
(21%)
(19%)

100 (100%)

Which ethnic/racial group do you consider yourself?
White,
Black.
Asian or Pacific Islander..
American Indian.
Other...
Total.

85
04
04
05
02
00

(85%)
(04%)
(04%)
(05%)
(02%)
(00%)

00 (100%)
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Q-23.

How many years have you lived in the Las Vegas area?
Less than 5years...........
5-10 years.................
11-20 years................
Over 20 years..............
Total....................

Q-24.

39
12
25
24

(39%)
(12%)
(25%)
(24%)

1 00 (1 00%)

Are you currently married?
N o ........................
Y e s .......................
Total

29 (29i%)
69 (70i%)
98 (1 00%)

If "yes", does your spouse have or is applying for
a CCW?
N o ........................
Ye s .......................
Total

0-25.

34
28

(55%)
(45%)

62 (100%)

Which of the following broad categories best
represents your total family income before taxes
in 1995?
Less than $10,000..... ...
$1 0,000 to $29, 999.... ...
$30,000 to $49, 999.... ...
$50,000 to $69,999.... .. .
$70,000 to $99, 999.... ...
$100,000 or more......
Total................ ...

02
10
38
21
12
08

(02%)
(11%)
(42%)
(23%)
(13%)
(09%)

91 (100%)

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.
Your answers are valued and appreciated.
PLEASE RETURN
THIS COMPLETED SURVEY TO YOUR CCW CLASSROOM INSTRUCTOR.
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U N IV E R S IT Y O F N E V A D A LA S V E G A S

DATE:

May 23, 1996

TO:

Gary Yuen (CRJ)
M/S 5009
-yi H-x
FROM: ' . Sr. William E. Schulze, Director
/^Office of Sponsored. Programs (X13 57)
RE:

i

Status of Human Subject Protocol Entitled:
"A Survey of Nevada Concealed Carry Weapons
Application"

Permit

OSP #104s0596-G33e
The protocol for the project referenced above has been reviewed by
the Office of Sponsored Programs and it has been determined that it
meets the criteria for exemption from full review by the UNLV human
subjects Institutional Review Board.
Except for any required
conditions or modifications noted below, this protocol is approved
for a period of one year from the date of this notification, and
work on the project may proceed.
Should ■ the use of human subjects described in this protocol
continue beyond a year from the date of this notification, it will
be necessary to request an extension.

cc:

T. Miethe
OSP File

(CRJ-50091

Office of Sponsored Programs
4505 Maryland Parkway • Box 451037 " Las Vegas. Nevada 89154-1037
(702) 895-1357 • FAX (702) 895-4242
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